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This paper shows that the quantitative predictions of a DSGE model with an endogenous collateral
constraint are consistent with key features of the emerging markets' Sudden Stops. Business cycle
dynamics produce periods of expansion during which the ratio of debt to asset values raises enough
to trigger the constraint. This sets in motion a deflation of Tobin’s Q driven by Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation
mechanism, which causes a spiraling decline in credit access and in the price and quantity of collateral
assets. Output and factor allocations decline because the collateral constraint limits access to working
capital financing. This credit constraint induces significant amplification and asymmetry in the responses
of macro-aggregates to shocks. Because of precautionary saving, Sudden Stops are low probability








“A story is a string of actions occurring over time, and debt happens as a result of actions 
occurring over time. Therefore, any debt involves a plot line: how you got into debt, what you 
did, said and thought while you were there, and then—depending on whether the ending is to be 
happy or sad—how you got out of debt, or else how you go further and further into it until you 
became overwhelmed by it, and sank from view.” (Margaret Atwood, “Debtor’s Prism,” Wall 
Street Journal, 09/20/2008, p. W1) 
 
1.      Introduction 
 
  The Great Depression showed that market economies can experience deep recessions 
that differ markedly from typical business cycle downturns. The recessions that hit emerging 
economies in the aftermath of the financial crises of the late 1990s illustrated the same fact. 
In contrast with the Great Depression, however, the loss of access to world capital markets 
played a key role in emerging markets crises. That is, these crises featured the phenomenon 
now commonly referred to as a “Sudden Stop.” 
 
  Three striking macroeconomic regularities characterize Sudden Stops: (1) reversals of 
international capital flows, reflected in sudden increases in net exports and the current 
account, (2) declines in domestic production and absorption, and (3) corrections in asset 
prices. Figure 1 illustrates these facts using five-year event windows, centered on Sudden 
Stop events occurring at date t. The dating and location of Sudden Stops follows Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi’s (2006) classification.
1 The charts show event dynamics for output 
(GDP), consumption (C), investment (I), the net exports-GDP ratio (NXY) and Tobin’s Q. 
Data for GDP, C, I, and NXY are from World Development Indicators. Q is estimated for 
each country as the median across firm-level estimates computed for listed corporations 
using  Worldscope data. Firm-level Q is the ratio of market value of equity plus debt 
outstanding to book value of equity. The observations in the event windows correspond to 
cross-country medians of deviations from Hodrick-Prescott trends estimated using 1970-2006 
data for each country, except for Q which is not detrended because the data starts in 1994.
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  As Figure 1 shows, Sudden Stops are preceded by expansions, with domestic absorption 
and production above trend, the trade balance below trend, and high asset prices. The 
median Sudden Stop displays a reversal in the cyclical component of NXY of about 3 
percentage points of GDP, from a deficit of about 2 percent of GDP at t-1 to a surplus of 1 
percent of GDP at t, and this surplus persists at t+1 and t+2. GDP and C are about 4 
percentage points below trend at date t, and I collapses almost 20 percentage points below 
trend. The economies recover somewhat afterwards, but GDP, C and I remain below trend 
two years after the Sudden Stops hit. Q reaches a through at date t about 13 percentage 
points below the pre-Sudden-Stop peak, and it recovers about 2/3rds of its value by t+2. 
                                          
1 Calvo et al. identified 33 Sudden Stop events with large and mild output collapses in a sample 
including the 31 countries that JP Morgan defines as emerging markets. Their paper provides further 
details. Calvo and Reinhart (1999), Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2006), and Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin (2000) use other definitions of Sudden Stops, but the actual listings of events are very similar. 
2 Note two differences with the event analysis in Calvo et al. First, they study event windows with 
cross-country averages of country-specific cumulative growth rates. We use medians instead of 
averages because of substantial cross-country dispersion in cyclical components, and deviations from 
trend instead of cumulative growth to remove low-frequency dynamics. Second, Calvo et al. focus 
mainly on Sudden Stops with large output collapses. Here we include all Sudden Stop events.  
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  In addition to the stylized facts illustrated in Figure 1, Sudden Stops are characterized 
by three important features: First, Sudden Stops are nested within typical business cycles. 
They are rare events in each country by construction, because a key criterion to identify 
them is that a country’s international capital flows are significantly below their mean (see 
Calvo et al. (2006)). Second, they represent business cycle asymmetries (i.e., symmetric 
episodes of sudden large drops in trade surpluses accompanied by surges in output and 
absorption are not observed). Third, standard growth accounting shows that a large drop in 
the Solow residual accounts for a Sudden Stops’ initial output collapse. Part of this is due to 
factors that bias the Solow residual as a measure of “true” total factor productivity (TFP), 
such as changes in imported inputs, capacity utilization, and labor hoarding (see Bergoeing 
et. al. (2002), Mendoza (2006), and Meza and Quintin (2006)). For instance, Mendoza shows 
that in Mexico’s 1995 Sudden Stop, a large drop in imported inputs accounts for 3.1 
percentage points of the 8.5 percent fall in output per worker between the 94:Q3 and 95:Q2. 
 
  The characteristics that define Sudden Stops suggest that a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model aiming to explain this phenomenon should support a stochastic 
steady state in which infrequent Sudden Stops are nested together with normal business 
cycles. In addition, the model should display amplification and asymmetry of economic 
fluctuations during Sudden Stop episodes: Typical realizations of the same underlying 
exogenous shocks that produce normal business cycles in non-Sudden Stop states should 
result in reversals of capital flows, economic recessions and declines in asset prices during 
Sudden Stops. Moreover, Sudden Stops should feature endogenous declines in variables that 
affect Solow residuals, and these should play a role in the output drop. This paper proposes 
a model with these properties, and shows that it can deliver quantitative predictions 
consistent with actual Sudden Stops. 
 
  Explaining Sudden Stops is a challenge for a large class of DSGE small open economy 
(SOE) models, including frictionless real business cycle models and models with nominal 
rigidities. This is because these models typically assume perfect world credit markets that 
act as an efficient vehicle for consumption smoothing and investment financing. For 
example, in response to a large output drop, households formulate optimal plans to smooth 
the effect on consumption by borrowing from abroad, while in the data the opposite is 
observed (the external accounts rise sharply precisely when consumption and output 
collapse). In contrast, the literature on Sudden Stops emphasizes the role of credit frictions. 
Several studies propose models that predict adjustments in production, absorption and the 
external accounts as a result of the adverse effects of these frictions (e.g. Auenhaimer and 
Garcia (2000), Izquierdo (2000), Calvo (1998), Gopinath (2003), Cook and Choi (2003), 
Cook and Devereux (2006a, 2006b), Martin and Rey (2006), and Gertler, Gilchrist and 
Natalucci (2007)). The model proposed in this paper follows on a similar path, but it differs 
in its focus on the amplification and asymmetry of macroeconomic fluctuations that Irving 
Fisher’s (1933) classic debt-deflation transmission mechanism produces. 
 
  The model introduces an endogenous collateral constraint with the debt-deflation 
mechanism into a DSGE-SOE model driven by three standard exogenous shocks affecting 
TFP, the foreign interest rate, and the price of imported intermediate goods. The collateral 
constraint limits total debt, including both standard intertemporal debt and atemporal 
working capital loans, not to exceed a fraction of the market value of the physical capital 
that serves as collateral. Thus, the constraint imposes an upper bound on the aggregate  
  3
leverage ratio of the economy. The emphasis is on studying the quantitative significance of 
this credit friction, along the lines of the growing literature on the macroeconomic 
implications of credit constraints (as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1998), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Kocherlakota (2000), Cooley, Miramon and 
Quadrini (2004), Jermann and Quadrini (2005), and Gertler, et al. (2007)). 
 
  Standard DSGE-SOE models cannot produce Sudden Stops even if working capital 
and/or imported inputs are added. Agents in these models still have unrestricted access to a 
perfect international credit market. Negative shocks to TFP and/or the world price of 
imported inputs induce standard consumption-smoothing and investment-reducing effects. 
Large shocks could trigger large output collapses driven in part by cuts in imported inputs, 
but this would still fail to explain the current account reversal and the collapse in 
consumption (since households would borrow from abroad to smooth consumption). Adding 
large shocks to the world interest rate or access to external financing can alter these results, 
but such a theory of Sudden Stops would hinge entirely on unexplained “large and 
unexpected” shocks. Large, because by definition they need to induce recessions larger than 
the normal non-Sudden-Stop recessions, and unexpected (i.e. outside the set realizations 
agents consider possible), because otherwise agents would self-insure to undo their real 
effects. Paradoxically, large, unexpected shocks often drive reversals of capital flows in the 
models proposed in the Sudden Stops literature (e.g. Calvo (1988)). In contrast, this paper 
shows that a debt-deflation-style collateral constraint can provide an explanation for Sudden 
Stops that does not hinge on large, unexpected shocks. 
 
  The debt-deflation collateral constraint adds three important elements to the model’s 
business cycle transmission mechanism that are crucial for the quantitative results: 
  
(1) The constraint is occasionally binding, because it only binds when the leverage ratio is 
sufficiently high. When this happens, the economy responds to typical realizations of the 
exogenous shocks by displaying Sudden Stops. Moreover, if the constraint does not bind, the 
shocks yield similar macroeconomic responses as in a typical DSGE-SOE model with 
working capital and perfect credit markets. As a result, the economy displays “normal” 
business cycle patterns when the collateral constraint does not bind.  
 
(2)  The loss of credit market access is endogenous. In particular, the high leverage ratios at 
which the collateral constraint binds are reached after sequences of realizations of the 
exogenous shocks lead the endogenous business cycle dynamics of the economy to states with 
sufficiently high leverage. Since net exports are countercyclical in the model, these high-
leverage states are preceded by economic expansions, as observed in emerging economies. 
However, Sudden Stops have a low long-run probability of occurring, because agents 
accumulate precautionary savings to reduce the likelihood of large consumption drops. 
Hence, Sudden Stops are rare events nested within typical business cycles. 
 
(3) Sudden Stops are driven by two “credit channel” effects that induce amplification, 
asymmetry and persistence in the effects of exogenous shocks. The first is an endogenous 
financing premium that affects one-period debt, working capital loans, and the return on 
equity because the effective cost of borrowing rises when the collateral constraint binds. The 
second is the debt-deflation mechanism: When the collateral constraint binds, agents 
liquidate capital in order to meet “margin calls.” This fire-sale of assets reduces the price of  
  4
capital and tightens further the constraint, setting off a spiraling collapse of asset prices. 
Consumption, investment and the trade deficit suffer contemporaneous reversals as a result, 
and future capital, output, and factor allocations fall in response to the initial investment 
decline. In addition, the restricted access to working capital induces contemporaneous 
declines in production and factor demands. 
 
  The quantitative analysis of the model is conducted using a baseline calibration based 
on a detailed analysis of Mexican data, but the focus is on exploring the model’s ability to 
match the Sudden Stop features observed across countries. The upper bound on leverage is 
calibrated so that the model’s stochastic stationary equilibrium matches the observed 
frequency of Sudden Stops in the dataset of Calvo et al. (2006), which is about 3.3 percent. 
The long-run probability of observing Sudden Stops is reduced by precautionary savings, 
and hence the model requires an upper bound on the leverage ratio of about 1/5 in order to 
match the 3.3 percent Sudden Stops probability. 
 
  The results show that model economies with and without the collateral constraint 
exhibit largely the same long-run business cycle co-movements, but the economy with the 
collateral constraint displays significant amplification and asymmetry in the responses of 
macroeconomic aggregates to one-standard-deviation shocks. Amplification is reflected in 
significantly larger average responses conditional on positive-probability states in which the 
collateral constraint binds. Asymmetry is shown in that the responses to shocks of the same 
magnitude, but conditional on states in which the collateral constraint does not bind, are 
about the same in the economies with and without the credit friction. 
 
  The ability of the model to replicate observed Sudden Stops is evaluated by conducting 
stochastic simulations and constructing event analysis windows with the simulated data that 
are comparable with those shown in Figure 1. The results indicate that the model matches 
the behavior of output, consumption, investment and net exports, including the collapse 
when Sudden Stops hit, the periods of economic expansion that precede them, and the 
pattern of the recovery that follows. The model also replicates the observed dynamics of 
Tobin’s Q qualitatively, but quantitatively it underestimates the collapse of asset prices. 
Moreover, in the model’s Sudden Stop events, the Solow residual overestimates the true 
estate of TFP by about 30 percent. 
 
  Sensitivity analysis shows that the loss of access to working capital financing plays a 
key role in the model’s ability to produce amplification and asymmetry in the responses of 
GDP and factor allocations, in yielding Sudden Stop dynamics consistent with those 
observed in the data, and in producing a gap between true TFP and the Solow residual. 
Increasing the share of imported inputs in production increases the amplitude of the Sudden 
Stop-induced fluctuations in GDP, factor allocations and working capital, and it also 
increases the bias between the Solow residual and true TFP (with the former overstating the 
latter by about 50 percent). The opposite results are obtained if instead of increasing the 
share of imported inputs in production we lower the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. 
 
  The collateral constraint used in this paper is similar to the margin constraint used by 
Mendoza and Smith (2006) in their extension of the Aiyagari-Gertler (1999) setup to an 
environment of global asset trading. The model studied here is significantly different, 
because it is a full-blown equilibrium business cycle model with endogenous capital  
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accumulation and dividend payments that vary in response to the collateral constraint, and 
the constraint limits access to working capital financing. In contrast, Mendoza and Smith 
study a setup in which production and dividend payments are unaffected by the credit 
constraint, abstract from modeling capital accumulation, and consider a credit constraint 
that limits only the access to household debt.  
 
  This paper is also closely related to two important strands of the literature that study 
the quantitative implications of financial constraints for emerging markets business cycles. 
One is the strand that studies the effects of working capital financing on long-run business 
cycle co-movements (see Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and Oviedo 
(2004)). The model of this paper differs in one key respect: Working capital loans require 
collateral, so that when the collateral constraint binds, the cutoff in working capital loans 
contributes to the amplification and asymmetry observed in the Sudden Stop responses of 
output and factor demands to shocks. Moreover, the model is parameterized so that only a 
small fraction of factor costs needs to be paid in advance. As result, in the absence of the 
collateral constraint, working capital makes little difference for business cycle dynamics 
(relative to a frictionless economy). 
 
  The second strand of the quantitative business cycles literature related to this paper is 
the one that introduced the Bernanke-Gertler financial accelerator into DSGE-SOE models 
with nominal rigidities. Notably, Gertler et al. (2007) calibrated a model of this class to 
Korean data, and studied its ability to account for the 1997-1998 Korean crash as a response 
to a large exogenous shock to the real foreign interest rate. In addition, Gertler et al. 
introduced a mechanism to drive the output collapse together with a decline in productivity 
as measured by the Solow residual by modeling variable capital utilization. This paper 
introduces a different financial accelerator mechanism, based on an occasionally binding 
collateral constraint, and uses imported intermediate goods to produce a decline in the Solow 
residual.
3 The qualitative interpretation of the feedback between asset prices and debt is 
similar to the one in Gertler et al., but the debt-deflation mechanism yields endogenous 
Sudden Stops that do not require large, unexpected shocks, co-exist with regular business 
cycles, and produce asymmetric effects that amplify business cycle downturns. On the other 
hand, since solving the model requires non-linear global solution methods for DSGE-SOE 
models with incomplete markets, the model is much less flexible than the framework of 
Gertler et al. for studying the interaction of the financial accelerator with nominal rigidities 
and monetary and exchange rate policy. 
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes its 
competitive equilibrium. Sections 3 and 4 focus on calibrating the model and conducting the 
quantitative analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   A Model of Sudden Stops and Business Cycles with Collateral Constraints 
 
  The model economy is a variation of the standard DSGE-SOE model with incomplete 
insurance markets, capital adjustment costs, and working capital financing (e.g. Mendoza 
(1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006)). Two important 
                                          
3 A previous version of this paper used both imported inputs and variable utilization (see Mendoza 
(2006)). The latter was harder to calibrate and its contribution was quantitatively smaller.   
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modifications are introduced here. First, we introduce an endogenous collateral constraint. 
Second, the supply-side of the model is modified to introduce imported inputs. 
 
2.1 Optimization problem 
 
  The economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived, self-employed representative firm- 
household.
4 The preferences of this agent are defined over stochastic sequences of 
consumption ct and labor supply Lt, for t=0,…,∞ . Preferences are modeled using Epstein’s 
(1983) Stationary Cardinal Utility (SCU) function, which features an endogenous rate of 
time preference, so as to obtain a unique, invariant limiting distribution of foreign assets.
5   
 
  The preference specification is: 













⎡⎧ ⎫ ⎤ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎢⎥ −− − ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎣⎩ ⎭ ⎦ ∑∑  (1) 
In this expression, u(.) is a standard twice-continuously-differentiable and concave period 
utility function and ρ(.) is an increasing, concave and twice-continuously-differentiable time 
preference function. Following Greenwood et al. (1988), utility is defined in terms of the 
excess of consumption relative to the disutility of labor, with the latter given by the twice-
continuously-differentiable, convex function N(.). This assumption eliminates the wealth 
effect on labor supply by making the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
labor independent of consumption. 
 
  There are other approaches in addition to using Epstein’s SCU that yield well-defined 
stochastic stationary equilibria in DSGE-SOE models (see Arellano and Mendoza (2003) and 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) for details).
6 In models with credit constraints, SCU has the 
advantage that it can support stationary equilibria in which the constraints can bind 
permanently. This is because a binding credit constraint drives a wedge between the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the rate of interest. In a 
stationary state with a binding credit constraint, the rate of time preference adjusts 
endogenously to accommodate this wedge. In contrast, in models with an exogenous discount 
factor, credit constraints never bind in the long run (if the rate of time preference is greater 
                                          
4 Mendoza (2006) presents a different decentralization of a similar setup where firms and households 
are modeled as separate agents, and face separate collateral constraints. The setup with a self-
employed representative firm-household yields very similar predictions and is much simpler to 
describe and solve (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach).   
5 Since agents face non-insurable income shocks and the interest rate is exogenous, precautionary 
saving leads foreign assets to diverge to infinity with the standard assumption of a constant rate of 
time preference equal to the interest rate.    
6 Epstein showed that SCU requires weaker preference axioms than those behind the standard utility 
function with exogenous discounting. Standard preferences require preferences over stochastic future 
allocations to be risk-independent from past allocations, and past allocations to be risk-independent 
from future allocations, while SCU only requires the latter. He also proved that a preference order 
consistent with the weaker axioms can be expressed as a time-recursive utility function if and only if 
it takes the form of the SCU. Hence, other ad-hoc formulations of endogenous discounting can deliver 
stationary net foreign asset positions, but they violate the preference axioms.  
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or equal to the world interest rate) or always bind at steady state (if the rate of time 
preference is fixed below the interest rate). 
 
  The economy operates a constant-returns-to-scale technology, exp(εt
A)F(kt,Lt,vt), that 
requires capital, kt, labor and imported inputs vt, to produce a tradable good sold at a world-
determined price (normalized to unity without loss of generality). TFP is subject to a 
random shock εt
A with exponential support. Net investment, zt = kt+1 - kt, incurs unitary 
investment costs determined by the function Ψ(zt/kt), which is linearly homogeneous in zt 
and kt.
 7 Working capital loans from foreign lenders are needed to pay for a fraction φ of the 
cost of imported inputs and labor in advance of sales. The gross interest rate on these loans 
is the world real interest rate Rt=Rexp(εt
R ), where εt
R is an interest rate shock around a 
mean value R. As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006), working capital 
loans are provided at the beginning of each period and repaid at the end. Imported inputs 
are purchased at an exogenous relative price in terms of the world’s numeraire pt=pexp(εt
P), 
where p is the mean price and εt
P is a shock to the world price of imported inputs (i.e., a 
terms-of-trade shock from the perspective of the SOE). The shocks εt
A, εt
R  and εt
P follow a 
joint first-order Markov process to be specified in more detail later. 
  
  The representative agent chooses sequences of consumption, labor, investment, and 
holdings of real, one-period international bonds, bt+1, so as to maximize SCU subject to the 
following period budget constraint: 
  ( )( ) 1 exp( ) ( , , ) 1 Ab













⎡⎛ ⎞ ⎤ − ⎟ ⎜ ⎢⎥ ⎟ =+ − + Ψ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎢⎥ ⎟ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
is gross investment. The agent also faces the 
following collateral constraint:  
  ( ) 11
b
tt t tt tt tt qb R wL pv qk φκ ++ −+ ≥ −  (3) 
  In the constraints (2) and (3), wt is the wage rate,  b
t q  is the price of bonds and qt is the 
price of domestic capital. The price of bonds is exogenous and satisfies  1/ b
tt qR = , while wt 
and qt are endogenous prices that are taken as given by the representative agent and satisfy 
standard market optimality conditions: The price of capital equals the marginal cost of 
investment,  11 (, ) / () tt t t t qi k k k ++ =∂ ∂ , and the wage rate equals the marginal disutility of 
labor, () / tt t wN LL =∂ ∂ , where variables with bars are “market averages” taken as given by 
the representative agent but equal to the representative agent’s choices at equilibrium. 
 
  The collateral constraint (3) implies that credit markets are imperfect. In particular, 
lenders impose a credit constraint in the form of the margin requirement proposed by 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1999): The economy’s total debt, including both debt in one-period 
bonds and in within-period working capital loans, cannot exceed a fraction κ of the 
“marked-to-market” value of capital (i.e. κ imposes an upper bound on the leverage ratio). 
Both interest and principal on working capital loans enter in the constraint because these 
                                          
7 Specifying the capital adjustment cost in terms of net investment, instead of gross investment, yields 
a more tractable recursive formulation of the economy’s optimization problem that preserves 
Hayashi’s (1982) results regarding the conditions that equate marginal and average Tobin Q.  
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are within-period loans, and thus lenders consider that the market value of the assets offered 
as collateral must cover both components. 
  
  The collateral constraint is not derived here from an optimal credit contract. Instead, 
the constraint is imposed directly as in the models with endogenous credit constraints 
examined by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), and Kocherlakota 
(2000). Still, a credit relationship with a constraint like (3) could result, for example, from 
an environment in which limited enforcement prevents lenders to collect more than a 
fraction κ of the value of a defaulting debtor’s assets. As we explain below, in states of 
nature in which (3) binds, the model produces endogenous premia over the world interest 
rate at which borrowers would agree to contracts which satisfy (3).  
 
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium & Credit Channels 
 
  A competitive equilibrium for the small open economy is defined by stochastic sequences 
of allocations  11 0 ,, , ,, tt t t t t cLk b vi
∞
++ ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ and prices 
0 , tt qw
∞ ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦ such that: (a) the representative firm-
household maximizes SCU subject to (2) and (3), taking as given wages, the price of capital, 
the world interest rate, and the initial conditions (k0,b0), (b) wages and the price of capital 
satisfy 11 (, ) / () tt t t t qi k k k ++ =∂ ∂  and  () / tt t wN LL =∂ ∂  and (c) the representative agent’s 
choices satisfy  tt kk = and tt LL = . 
 
  In the absence of credit constraints, the competitive equilibrium is the same as in a 
standard DSGE-SOE model. In fact, removing also imported inputs, the model collapses into 
a model nearly identical to the models of Numeyer and Perri (2005) or Uribe and Yue 
(2006). The credit constraints distort the equilibrium by introducing two credit-channel 
effects. One of these effects is reflected in external financing premia affecting the cost of 
borrowing in bonds and working capital and the equity premium, and the second is the 
debt-deflation process. These credit-channel effects can be analyzed using the optimality 
conditions of the competitive equilibrium. 
 
  The optimality conditions of the representative agent’s problem yield the following 
Euler equation for bt+1: 
  11 01( ) ( ) 1 tt t t tt ER μλ λ λ ++ ⎡ ⎤ <− = ≤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  (4) 
where λt is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the date-t budget constraint (2), which 
equals also the lifetime marginal utility of ct, and μt is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier 
on the collateral constraint (3). It follows from (4) that, when the collateral constraint binds, 
the economy faces an endogenous external financing premium on the effective real interest 
rate at which it borrows ( 1
h
t R + ) relative to the world interest rate.  This expected external 

















+ ⎡⎤ −= ≡ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (5) 
This premium can be viewed as the premium at which the SOE would choose debt amounts 
that satisfy the collateral constraint with equality in a credit market in which the constraint 
is not imposed directly.  
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  In the canonical DSGE-SOE model, international bonds are a risk-free asset and μt=0 
for all t, so there is no premium. In the model examined here, if the collateral constraint 
binds, there is a direct effect by which the multiplier μt increases EFPD. In addition, there is 
an indirect effect that pushes in the same direction because a binding credit constraint 
makes it harder to smooth consumption, and hence the covariance between marginal utility 
and the world interest rate is likely to increase.  
 
  The effects of the EFPD on asset pricing can be derived from the Euler equation for 
capital. Solving forward this equation, taking into account that at equilibrium qt equals the 
marginal cost of investment, yields the following: 
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Thus, the price of capital equals the expected present discounted value of future dividends 
(d), discounted at a rate that reflects the effect of the collateral constraint.  
 
  The above asset pricing formula can be simplified further by combining the Euler 
equations for bonds and capital to obtain the following expression for the equity premium 
(the expected excess return on capital,  ( ) 11 1 /
q
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This expression collapses to the standard equity premium if the collateral constraint does 
not bind and the world interest rate is deterministic. As Mendoza and Smith (2006) 
explained, when the collateral constraint binds it induces direct and indirect effects on the 
equity premium similar to those affecting EFPD. The two premia are not the same, 
however, because in the equity premium the direct effect of the binding collateral constraint 
on EFPD is reduced by the term 1 tt t E μκ λ+ ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦ , which measures the marginal benefit of being 
able to borrow more by holding an additional unit of capital. There is also a new element in 
the indirect effect that is not present in the EFPD, and is implicit in the covariance between 
λt+1 and  1
q
t R + : A binding collateral constraint makes it harder for agents to smooth 
consumption and self-insure, and hence this covariance term is likely to become more 
negative when the constraint binds, thereby increasing the equity premium.  
 







tt t i q






⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎢⎥ ⎟ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢⎜ ⎥ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ ∏  (8) 
It follows then from (7) and (8) that, as Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) showed, higher 
expected returns when the collateral constraint binds at present, or is expected to bind in 
the future, increase the discount rate of dividends and lower asset prices in the present.  
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  The external financing premium on working capital financing is easy to identify in the 
optimality conditions for factor demands: 




tt t tt t t FkLv w r R
μ
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These are standard conditions equating marginal products with marginal costs. In the right-




λ reflects the increase in the effective marginal 
financing cost of working capital caused by a binding collateral constraint. This external 
financing premium on working capital represents the excess over the world interest rate at 
which domestic agents in a competitive world market of working capital loans would find it 
optimal to agree to contracts that satisfy constraint (3) voluntarily. 
 
  The second credit channel present in the model, the debt-deflation mechanism, is harder 
to illustrate than the external financing premia because of the lack of closed-form solutions, 
but it can be described intuitively: When the collateral constraint binds, agents respond to 
“margin calls” from lenders by fire-selling capital (i.e., by reducing their demand for equity). 
However, when they do this, they face an upward-sloping supply of equity because of 
Tobin’s Q. Thus, at equilibrium it is optimal to lower investment given the reduced demand 
for equity and higher discounting of future dividends, and hence equilibrium equity prices 
fall. If the credit constraint was set as an exogenous fixed amount, these would be the main 
adjustments. But with the endogenous collateral constraint, if the constraint was binding at 
the initial (notional) levels of the price of capital and investment, it must be more binding at 
lower prices and investment levels, so another round of margin calls takes place and Fisher’s 
debt-deflation mechanism is set in motion. Moreover, the Fisherian deflation causes a sudden 
increase in the financing cost of working capital, lowering factor allocations and output. 
 
  Interestingly, the effects of the debt-deflation mechanism are non-monotonic, because 
they are weaker at the extremes in which the SOE can collateralize all of its assets (κ=1) or 
cannot borrow at all (κ=0) than in the cases in between. When κ=0 there can be no debt-
deflation, since the constraint does not respond to asset values (i.e., it becomes an exogenous 
credit limit). On the other hand, when κ=1 there is no direct effect from the collateral 
constraint on the equity premium, which leaves only the indirect covariance effects to distort 
investment and the price of capital relative to the equilibrium with perfect credit markets. 
In the limiting case without uncertainty, the indirect effects vanish, and κ=1 removes all 
distortions on investment and the price of capital, and hence there is no debt-deflation 
mechanism again. Consumption and debt still adjust, but they do so as they would with an 
exogenous credit constraint. Hence, for the debt-deflation mechanism to operate, credit 
markets must allow borrowers to leverage their assets but only to some degree.  
 
  Mendoza (2006) illustrates the above arguments using a simple numerical example 
based on a deterministic version of the model. This example is comparable to the one 
conducted by Kocherlakota (2000). Mendoza found large amplification effects of the 
collateral constraint on output and asset prices. In contrast, Kocherlakota found small 
amplification effects, using a borrowing constraint of the form  1 tt t bq x + ≥ , where xt can be a 
fixed factor (e.g., land) or physical capital. The two sets of results are consistent, however,  
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because the case with land prevents declines in xt from compounding with the decline in 
asset prices in the debt-deflation dynamics, and with capital, the constraint  1 tt t bq x + ≥  
implies κ=1 (which under perfect foresight removes the debt-deflation mechanism). 
 
  It is also important to note that a variety of actual contractual arrangements can 
produce debt-deflation dynamics. The collateral constraint (3) resembles most directly a 
contract with a margin clause. This clause requires borrowers to surrender the control of 
collateral assets when the contract is entered, and gives creditors the right to sell them when 
their market value falls below the contract value. Other widely used arrangements that can 
trigger debt-deflation dynamics without explicit margin clauses include value-at-risk 
strategies of portfolio management used by investment banks, and mark-to-market capital 
requirements imposed by regulators. For example, if an aggregate shock hits capital markets, 
value-at-risk estimates increase and lead investment banks to reduce their exposure, but 
since the shock is aggregate, the resulting sale of assets increases price volatility and leads 
value-at-risk models to require further portfolio adjustments. Mechanisms like these played a 
central role in the Russian/LTCM crisis of 1998 and the U.S. credit crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
 3.  Functional Forms and Calibration 
 
3.1 Functional Forms and Numerical Solution 
 
  The quantitative analysis uses a benchmark calibration based on Mexican data. The 
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⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ Ψ= ≥ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠  (14) 
The utility and time preference functions in (11) and (12) are standard from DSGE-SOE 
models. The parameter σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ω determines the wage 
elasticity of labor supply, which is given by 1/(ω -1), and γ is the semi-elasticity of the rate 
of time preference with respect to composite good c-N(L). The restriction γ  ≤  σ is a 
condition required to ensure that SCU supports a unique, invariant limiting distribution of 
bonds and capital (see Epstein (1983)). The Cobb-Douglas technology (13) is the production 
function for gross output. Equation (14) is the net investment adjustment cost function. 
Following Hayashi (1982), the production and adjustment cost functions are set to be 
linearly homogeneous in their arguments. 
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  The model is solved numerically by representing the equilibrium in recursive form and 
using a non-linear global solution method with the collateral constraint imposed as an 
occasionally binding inequality constraint (see Mendoza and Smith (2006) and Arellano and 
Mendoza (2003) for details on algorithms for solving DSEG-SOE models with incomplete 
markets and collateral constraints). The endogenous state variables are k and b. These are 
chosen from discrete grids of NK non-negative values of the capital stock, K={k1<k2 <…< 
kNK}, and NB values of bond positions, B={b1<b2 <…< bNB}. The exogenous states are the 
realizations of shocks in the triple e=(ε 
A,ε 
R,ε 
P). The shocks follow a joint Markov process, 
which defines the set E of all triples of possible realizations of the shocks and their one-step 
transition probability matrix π. Hence, the state space of the problem is defined by all 
triples (k,b,e) in the set K×B×E. In the numerical solutions reported in Section 4, we set 
NK=60 and NB=80, with both grids evenly spaced. Also, we use 2 realizations for each 
Markov shock, so there are 8 triples of realizations of shocks. Hence, the discrete state space 
of the model has 60×80×8 coordinates. 
 
3.2 Calibration  
 
  The values assigned to the model’s parameters are listed in Table 1. This calibration is 
set so that the deterministic stationary equilibrium matches key averages from Mexican 
data. We adopt three assumptions to make the calibration easier to compare with typical 
DSGE-SOE calibrations: (1) φ=0 in the deterministic steady state (otherwise working 
capital payments distort factor shares), (2) the collateral coefficient does not bind at the 
deterministic steady state, and (3) the CRRA coefficient is set to σ=2. 
 
  The measure of gross output (y) in Mexican data that is consistent with the one in the 
model is the sum of GDP plus imported inputs. The data for these variables are available 
quarterly (at annual rates) starting in 1993. Using data for the period 1993:Q1-2005:Q2, the 
annualized average ratio of GDP to gross output (gdp/y) is 0.896 and the ratio of imported 
inputs to GDP (pv/gdp) is 0.114. The average share of imported inputs in gross output is 
0.102, hence η=0.102. This factor share, combined with the 0.66 labor share on GDP from 
Garcia (2005) implies the following factor shares for the production function (13): 
0.66
1(/ ) pv gdp
α




  We also use Garcia’s (2005) estimates of Mexico’s capital stock, together with our 
measure of y, to construct an estimate of the capital-gross output ratio (k/y) and to set the 
value of the depreciation rate. He used annual National Accounts investment data for the 
period 1950-2000 and the perpetual inventories method to construct a time series of the 
capital-GDP ratio. The average capital-GDP ratio for the 1980-2000 period is 1.88 with a 
1980 point estimate of 1.56. Using these annual benchmarks, we constructed a quarterly 
capital stock series compatible with the quarterly gross output estimates (starting in 1980 
because quarterly investment data, again at annual rates, are available as of 1980:Q1). The 
annualized quarterly capital stock estimates match Garcia’s annual benchmarks by setting 
                                          
8 The actual share of labor income in GDP is about 1/3 in National Accounts data but Garcia showed 
that there are measurement problems in separating capital and labor incomes in the National 
Accounts. Estimating factor shares using household survey data he estimated the labor share at about 
2/3rds, which is in line with the usual estimates for the U.S. and other countries.   
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the initial capital-GDP ratio to 1.45 and the depreciation rate to 8.8 percent per year. The 
1980:Q1-2005:Q2 average of k/y is 1.758. Combined with the 0.088 depreciation rate, this 
value of k/y yields an average investment-gross output ratio (i/y) of 15.5 percent. 
 
  In the deterministic stationary state, imported input prices and the real interest rate 
take their mean values p and R. The value of p is set equal to the ratio of the averages of 
the ratios of imported inputs to gross output at current and constant prices, which is 1.028. 
The mean value of the annual gross real interest rate is derived by imposing the values of β, 
(i/y), and δ on the Euler equation for capital evaluated at steady state and solving for R. 
The resulting expression yields R=1+[δ(β-(i/y))]/(i/y)=1.086. A real interest rate of 8.6 
percent is relatively high, but in this calibration it represents the implied real interest rate 
that, given the values of δ and β, supports Mexico’s average investment-gross output ratio 
as a feature of the deterministic steady state of a standard SOE model. Note also that with 
this calibration strategy the deterministic steady state also matches Mexico’s average 
investment-GDP ratio of 17.2 percent. 
 
  The model’s optimality condition for labor supply equates the marginal disutility of 
labor with the real wage, which at equilibrium is equal to the marginal product of labor. 
This condition reduces to:  exp( ) () A
tt LF ω αε =⋅ . Using the logarithm of this expression, our 
estimate of gross output, and Mexican data on employment growth, the implied value of the 
exponent of labor supply in utility is ω = 1.846. This value is similar to those typically used 
in DSGE-SOE models (e.g. Mendoza (1991), Uribe and Yue (2006)). 
 
  Since aggregate demand in the data includes government expenditures, the model needs 
an adjustment to consider these purchases in order for the deterministic steady state to 
match the actual average private consumption-GDP ratio of 0.65. This adjustment is done 
by setting the deterministic steady state to match the observed average ratio of government 
purchases to GDP (0.11), assuming that these government purchases are unproductive and 
paid out of a time-invariant, ad-valorem consumption tax. The tax is equal to the ratio of 
the GDP shares of government and private consumption, 0.11/0.65=0.168, which is very 
close to the statutory value-added tax rate in Mexico. Since this tax is time invariant, it 
does not distort the intertemporal decision margins and any distortion on the consumption-
leisure margin does not vary over the business cycle. 
 
  Given the preference and technology parameters set in the previous paragraphs, the 
optimality conditions for L and v and the steady-state Euler equation for capital are solved 
as a nonlinear simultaneous equation system to determine the steady state levels of k, L, and 
v. Given these, the levels of gross output and GDP are computed using the production 
function and the definition of GDP, and the level of consumption is determined by 
multiplying GDP times the average consumption-GDP ratio in the data. The value of γ  









. As is typical in calibration exercises with SCU preferences 
(see Mendoza (1991)), the value of the time preference coefficient is very low, suggesting 
that the “impatience effects” introduced by the endogenous rate of time preference have 
negligible quantitative implications on business cycle dynamics. Finally, the steady-state 
foreign asset position follows from the budget constraint (eq. (2)) evaluated at steady state. 
This implies a ratio of net foreign assets to GDP of about -0.86.  
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  Next we calibrate the stochastic process of the exogenous shocks and compute Mexico’s 
business cycle moments. Table 2 summarizes key features of Mexico’s business cycles and 
the Sudden Stop of 1995. The Table provides indicators of business cycle variability, co-
movement and persistence of macroeconomic time series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter to 
detrend the data. The Table also reports moments for estimates of the model’s three 
exogenous shocks. TFP shocks are measured as the cyclical component of a TFP estimate 
constructed using the production function (13), together with the capital stock and gross 
output estimates discussed earlier, the calibrated factor shares, and observed data on L and 
v (see Mendoza (2006) for details). The price shocks are deviations from trend of the relative 
price of imported inputs, defined as the deflator of imported inputs divided by the exports 
deflator (so as to remove effects from changes in the nominal exchange rate or in 
nontradables prices). Interest rate shocks are the cyclical component of Uribe and Yue’s 
(2006) measure of Mexico’s real interest rate in world capital markets.  
 
  The business cycle moments reported in Table 2 are in line with well-known business 
cycle facts for emerging economies: Investment is more variable than GDP, private 
consumption is also more variable than GDP (although nondurables consumption is less 
variable than GDP), all variables exhibit positive first-order autocorrelations, consumption 
and investment are positively correlated with GDP and the external accounts are negatively 
correlated with GDP. In addition, the Table shows that both imported inputs and equity 
prices are significantly more variable than GDP and procyclical.  
 
  The model’s exogenous shocks follow a joint Markov process that approximates their 
time-series processes in the data. In the data, ε
A, ε
R and ε
P follow stationary AR(1) processes 
nearly independent of each other, except for a statistically significant, negative correlation 
between ε
R  and ε
P. Table 2 lists the standard deviations and first-order autocorrelations of 
the shocks. The correlation between interest rate and TFP shocks is -0.669. Note that the 
1995 Sudden Stop coincided with sizable shocks, but we will show below that Sudden Stops 
are possible in the model even with one-standard-deviation shocks. Also, typical endogeneity 
caveats apply to our estimates of ε
R, because of the link between country risk and business 
cycles, and ε
A, because of factors that affect measured TFP in addition to imported inputs, 
such as capacity utilization and factor hoarding. As a result, the “large” TFP and interest 
rate shocks reported for the 1995 Sudden Stop probably overestimate the true exogenous 
shocks that occurred that year. 
 
  The joint Markov process is a parsimonious chain with two-point realization vectors for 
each shock. Each realization is set equal to plus/minus one-standard deviation of the 
corresponding shock. The Markov transition probability matrix is constructed following the 
simple persistence rule. This imposes the condition that the first-order autocorrelation of the 
two correlated shocks (ε
A and ε
R) be the same, which is very much in line with the data 
since ρ(ε 
R)=0.572 and ρ(ε 
A)=0.537. 
 
  Two parameter values remain to be determined: the adjustment cost coefficient a and 
the working capital coefficient φ. We set these using the Simulated Method of Moments 
(SMM) so that the model matches the observed ratio of the standard deviation of Mexico’s 
gross investment relative to GDP (3.6) and a mean ratio of working capital to GDP of 1/5, 
in a simulation where the collateral constraint does not bind. This yields the values a=2.75 
and φ=0.26. This is a reasonable approach to calibrate a because this parameter does not  
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affect the deterministic steady state, but it affects the variability of investment. The working 
capital-GDP target of 20 percent is an approximation to actual data. Data on working 
capital financing for Mexico are not available, but the 1994:Q1-2005:Q1 average of total 
credit to private nonfinancial firms as a share of GDP was 24.4 percent. Note, however, that 
this measure includes financing at all maturities and for all uses, so it overestimates actual 
working capital financing. On the other hand, these data include the 1995-2002 period in 
which Mexican banks were being re-capitalized after the 1994 crisis, and credit declined 
sharply for “abnormal” reasons that bias the average credit-output ratio downwards.  
 
  It is also important to note that φ=0.26 is significantly lower than the working capital 
coefficients used in the DSGE-SOE models of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue 
(2006). As Oviedo (2004) showed, with low working capital coefficients, the working capital 
channel has very weak effects on business cycle moments. Hence, the role of working capital 
in this model is limited to the amplification and asymmetry that it contributes to when the 
collateral constraint binds. Its effect on regular business cycle volatility is negligible. 
 
4.      Results of the Quantitative Analysis 
 
  This section reports the results of a quantitative analysis that evaluates the model’s 
ability to account for the stylized facts of Sudden Stops, and the magnitude of the 
amplification and asymmetry in the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to shocks 
induced by the collateral constraint. 
 
4.1  Long Run Business Cycle Moments 
 
  The first result we establish is that long-run business cycle moments are largely 
unaffected by the collateral constraint. To make this point, we compare in Table 3 the 
business cycle moments of a frictionless economy without collateral constraints (Panel I) 
with those from two scenarios with different values of κ in which the constraint binds in 
some states of nature (Panels II with κ=0.3 and III with κ=0.2). These moments are 
computed using the model’s limiting distribution of k, b, and e in each scenario. The value of 
κ=0.2 was chosen to match the observed frequency of Sudden Stops (see 4.2 below), and 
κ=0.3 is shown for comparison. 
 
  The moments listed in Panel I show that the model does well at accounting for Mexico’s 
key business cycle regularities. The model overestimates the variability of GDP (3.9 percent 
in the model v. 2.7 percent in the data), but scaling by the variability of output the model 
does a fair job at matching the variability of the other macro aggregates, and the GDP-
correlations and first-order autocorrelations are generally in line with the data. Note in 
particular that the model does well at accounting for three moments that the RBC-SOE 
literature emphasizes: consumption is more variable than GDP, the interest rate and GDP 
are negatively correlated, and net exports are countercyclical. Moreover, in contrast with the 
findings of Garcia, Pancrazi and Uribe (2006), the model does not yield near-unit-root 
behavior in the net exports-GDP ratio. In fact, it nearly matches the actual first-order 
autocorrelation of this variable (0. 769 in the model v. 0.797 in the data).  
 
  Panels II and III show that long-run business cycles in economies with collateral 
constraints are very similar to those observed in the frictionless economy of Panel I. The  
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credit friction only has large effects on the moments directly influenced by it: the leverage 
ratio, the ratio of foreign assets to GDP and the net exports-GDP ratio. The means of the 
leverage ratio and the foreign assets ratio rise, and the mean of the net exports-GDP ratio 
falls, the variability of the three declines, and all three become more countercyclical. 
 
  A key feature of the model behind the result that long-run business cycle moments in 
Panels II and III do not differ much from those of the frictionless economy in Panel I is the 
precautionary savings motive. The high-leverage states at which the credit constraint binds 
are reached after cyclical dynamics in response to sequences of realizations of the shocks lead 
the leverage ratio to approach its ceiling. Because of the curvature of the constant-relative-
risk-aversion period utility function, agents accumulate precautionary savings to self insure 
against the risk of large consumption collapses in these scenarios. Note that precautionary 
savings are present even without the collateral constraint, because even with perfect credit 
markets this DSGE-SOE model has incomplete markets. Hence the average b/gdp ratio with 
perfect credit markets at about -33 percent is almost 53 percentage points higher than in the 
deterministic steady state. With the collateral constraint at κ=0.2, the average b/gdp ratio 
climbs to -10 percent 
 
4.2  Amplification & Asymmetry with the Collateral Constraint 
  
  The second result we demonstrate is that the collateral constraint produces significant 
amplification and asymmetry in the responses of macro-economic aggregates to shocks. To 
show this result, Table 4 reports amplification coefficients for model simulations with the 
collateral constraint. The amplification coefficients correspond to differences in the response 
of each variable in the economy with the collateral constraint relative to the economy with 
perfect credit markets, in percent of the latter, for a common (k, b, e) triple. Since there is 
an amplification coefficient for each triple (k, b, e) in the state space, we report averages 
computed using the model’s ergodic distribution. The Table shows a set of coefficients for 
Sudden Stop (SS) states, defined in a manner analogous to those used in the empirical 
literature (e.g. Calvo et al. (2006)). In particular, SS states are those in which the collateral 
constraint binds (with positive long-run probability) and the net exports-GDP ratio is at 
least two percentage points above the mean. Non-SS states include all triples in the state 
space outside the SS set. The long-run probability of hitting SS states and the average debt 
ratio at which this happens are shown in the last two rows of the Table.   
 
  Panel (1) of the Table reports amplification coefficients for the baseline case with 
κ=0.2. With this upper bound on leverage, the probability of Sudden Stops is 3.3 percent, 
which matches the frequency of Sudden Stops in the cross-country panel dataset of Calvo et 
al. (2006). The SS column shows that when the economy hits a Sudden Stop, the collateral 
constraint amplifies significantly the response of all macroeconomic aggregates to shocks, 
relative to what is observed in the same (k,  b,  e) states in the economy without credit 
frictions. The increased responsiveness of the aggregates ranges from a decline in GDP below 
trend that is about 1.1 percent larger to a collapse in investment that is almost 12 
percentage points larger. Scaling by the cyclical variability of each aggregate listed in Panel 
III of Table 3, these excess responses imply business cycles that are larger than typical cycles 
by factors of about 1/3 for GDP to 1.4 for the net exports-GDP ratio.  
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  The model’s baseline amplification coefficients in Panel (1) of Table 4 are significantly 
larger than those computed by Kocherlakota (2000). He found that, varying the share of 
capital from 0.1 to 0.3, the amplification coefficients were small, ranging from 0.15 to 0.35 
for output (v. 1.13 in the model) and 0.004 to 0.008 for asset prices (v. 2.9 in the model). As 
explained earlier, Kocherlakota’s experiments produce weak amplification because they focus 
in cases in which either the collateral asset is in fixed supply (which weakens the debt-
deflation mechanism), or capital can be pledged as collateral up to 100 percent of its value 
(which under perfect foresight removes the debt-deflation mechanism completely). 
 
  The asymmetry of the amplification effects is illustrated by the stark comparison of the 
amplification coefficients across SS and non-SS columns. In non-SS states, the responses of 
macro-aggregates are about the same with the collateral constraint as with perfect credit 
markets, and scaling by the variability of each aggregate the difference across the two 
economies is negligible. Since Sudden Stop events are low probability events in the long-run, 
the business cycle moments shown in Table 3 reflect mainly these non-SS states in which 
there is no amplification due to the credit constraint, and this is consistent with the previous 
finding showing that the model with the collateral constraint displays business cycle 
moments very similar to those of the frictionless economy. A corollary of this result is that 
relatively rare Sudden Stops coexist with the more frequent, normal business cycles 
summarized in the moments of Table 3. It is also worth noting that the responses in the SS 
and non-SS columns are produced by shocks that are at most one-standard-deviation in size 
(as defined in the vector of realizations of the Markov chain), and that the exogenous shocks 
hitting the economies with and without the collateral constraint in each of the two columns 
are identical. Thus, the model displays significant amplification and asymmetry in response 
to shocks that are relatively small, and it has the feature that symmetric shocks produce 
asymmetric responses, the extreme case of which is a Sudden Stop. 
 
  Panels (2) to (5) of Table 4 show that the result indicating that the collateral constraint 
induces significant amplification and asymmetry in the macroeconomic effects of exogenous 
shocks is robust to several parameter changes. Panels (2) and (3) report results for κ=0.3 
and  κ=0.15 respectively. Panel (4) lowers the net exports-GDP threshold ratio used to 
define Sudden Stops from an increase of two percentage points above the mean to zero. 
Panel (5) removes working capital financing by setting φ=0. 
 
 Increasing  (reducing)  κ has small effects on the amplification coefficients, but it reduces 
(increases) the amplification effect on the leverage ratio and the probability of Sudden Stops. 
Lowering the net exports-GDP threshold to zero weakens the amplification coefficients 
somewhat, but again the largest effect is on the probability of Sudden Stops, which rises 
sharply when the threshold used to define them is lowered significantly. Still, in all these 
scenarios there is significant amplification and asymmetry. In the scenario without working 
capital, however, the model cannot generate any amplification in GDP and factor 
allocations, and the probability of Sudden Stops (keeping κ=0.2) is very low. This is because 
without working capital, factor allocations and output are not affected contemporaneously 
by the collateral constraint (capital is predetermined and the external financing premium on 
optimal factor demands is not present, so labor and intermediate goods are not affected by 
the collateral constraint). The rest of the macro-aggregates continue to display significant 
amplification and asymmetry, although the amplification coefficients are smaller than in the 
scenarios shown in the other panels. Thus, these results highlight the importance of the  
  18
collateral constraint limiting access to working capital for the model’s ability to produce 
significant amplification and asymmetry. 
  
4.3   Can the Model Explain Observed Sudden Stop Dynamics? 
 
  The numerical simulations can also be used to evaluate the model’s ability to account 
for the actual dynamics of Sudden Stop events in Figure 1 reviewed in the Introduction. To 
this end, we conduct a 10,000-period stochastic time series simulation of the model, and use 
the resulting artificial data to construct five-year event windows centered on SS events. 
Figure 2 shows the SS windows for GDP,  C,  I, Tobin’s Q, and NXY. To match the 
methodology used in Figure 1, each window includes the median across the SS events 
identified in the 10,000 period simulation. We also include for comparison + and – one-
standard-deviation bands, the actual event window observations from Figure 1, and the 
observations from Mexico’s 1995 Sudden Stop. To be consistent with Calvo et al.’s (2006) 
definition of systemic SS events with mild and large output collapses, a Sudden Stop event is 
identified as a situation in which the collateral constraint binds, output is at least one 
standard deviation below trend, and the net exports-GDP ratio is at least one standard 
deviation above trend. 
 
  The event windows in Figure 2 show that the model replicates most of the key features 
of the dynamics of actual SS events, except for the magnitude of the decline in asset prices. 
The model predicts that Sudden Stops are preceded by periods of economic expansion, with 
GDP, C and I above trend and NXY running deficits at t-2 and t-1. In the date of the SS 
events (date t), the model matches very closely the magnitude of the declines in GDP, C, 
and I. The reversal in NXY between t-1 and t is also very similar to the one in the data, but 
the levels in the model overestimate those in the data. The model is also consistent with the 
data in predicting a slow recovery in dates t+1 and t+2. With regard to Tobin’s Q, the 
model’s dynamics are qualitatively correct, but quantitatively the decline in asset prices is 
about 40 percent the size of the actual decline. Relative to the Mexican SS event, the model 
again matches very well the magnitude of the declines in GDP and C at date t, but it 
underestimates the pre-Sudden Stop boom and the size of the reversal in NXY. 
 
  Figure 3 shows event windows for true TFP (i.e. the productivity shock ε
A) and for the 
model’s Solow residual, defined as /(1 ) /(1 ) /( ) sg d pk L βη αη −− ≡ . In the baseline scenario with 
κ=0.2, the two are very similar except on the date of SS events. When Sudden Stops occur, 
the Solow residual falls more than true TFP. Thus, the model is also consistent with the 
data in predicting that part of the decline in GDP observed during SS events cannot be 
accounted for by changes in measured capital and labor, and that this decline in the Solow 
residual overestimates actual TFP (albeit the difference is not large). However, it is also 
important to acknowledge that true TFP still has to fall for the output decline to be 
realistic, and the reason why TFP would fall like this when a Sudden Stop hits remains an 
open question beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
  In summary, the model with the collateral constraint accounts for several key features 
of Sudden Stops. Large and infrequent recessions take place in response to shocks of 
standard magnitude when the economy is highly leveraged, and Sudden Stops are nested 
within normal business cycles. The economy arrives at these high-leverage states with 
positive long-run probability, and in these states binding collateral constraints cause large  
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amplification, asymmetry and persistence in macroeconomic responses to shocks. One 
weakness, however, is that the decline in asset prices is smaller than the observed collapse, 
but it is worth recalling that this, as well as all the other Sudden Stop effects studied in this 
paper, are in response to one-standard-deviation shocks. Larger shocks would trigger larger 
responses. Moreover, even at ½ the size of the actual price drop, the model generates 
significantly more asset price amplification than in previous studies (e.g. Kocherlakota 
(2000)). 
 
4.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
  Figure 4 compares Sudden Stop event windows for the baseline economy (with κ=0.2) 
with those of three alternative specifications: (1) the scenario without working capital (φ=0), 
(2) a simulation with a higher share of imported inputs in production (η=0.2 v. 0.1 in the 
baseline), and (3) a scenario with a higher value of ω (3 instead of 1.85), which implies a 
lower labor supply elasticity (0.5 instead of 1.2). The event dynamics observed in actual 
data are also included for comparison in Figure 4, and Figure 3 includes event windows 
comparing Solow residuals with true TFP in each of the three sensitivity analysis scenarios. 
Note that we consider relatively small changes in parameters because otherwise the 
economies differ sharply in debt and leverage dynamics, and this requires recalibrating κ in 
order to study the effects of the occasionally binding collateral constraint. In contrast, with 
the parameter changes we study here, the value of κ remains at 20 percent in all scenarios. 
 
  The simulation without working capital performs much worse than the baseline and the 
other alternatives in terms of its ability to account for observed Sudden Stop dynamics. 
Without working capital, the amplitude of the fluctuations observed in SS events is 
significantly smaller, but more significantly, the model fails to produce periods of economic 
expansion preceding Sudden Stops, as GDP, C and I are already below trend, and NXY is 
above trend, before the Sudden Stop hits. This occurs because SS events without working 
capital are preceded by periods of low and declining productivity (see Figure 3), instead of 
periods of high and increasing productivity as in the baseline. The expectation of declining 
productivity leads to a substantial decline in I at almost 15 percentage points below trend 
and drops in C and I of about 2 percentage points below trend by t-1, and this results in a 
sharp increase in the trade surplus to about 2.5 percentage points of GDP by the same date. 
For the same reason, labor and imported inputs fall sharply (instead of risinig) before the 
Sudden Stop hits, although again because the absence of working capital reduces the 
amplitude of the economy’s business cycle, the declines in labor and imported inputs at date 
t are much smaller than in the baseline. The output decline is not smaller at date t because 
the large decline in I at t-1 reduces the capital stock at t and this enlarges the size of the 
output drop, which otherwise would be much smaller than in the baseline (in the baseline, I 
rises at t-1 so the higher capital stock at t contributes to offset the contractionary effect of 
the declines in labor and imported inputs). Thus, these results reaffirm the previous finding 
indicating that the collateral constraint limiting access to working capital financing plays a 
very important role in the model’s performance. 
 
  The scenarios with higher imported inputs share and lower labor supply elasticity show 
that these parameters also play important roles. The shape of the SS dynamics is roughly 
the same as in the baseline, so the model’s overall performance does not worsen as in the 
scenario without working capital, but the amplitude of the fluctuations changes. A higher  
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share of imported inputs strengthens the production effects of all three shocks present in the 
model. As a result the declines in GDP, C, working capital, labor, and imported inputs are 
larger with the higher share of imported inputs, while the dynamics of I and Q are about the 
same as in the baseline. The fit with the data improves as the drops in output and 
consumption at date t are nearly a perfect match to those observed in actual SS events. In 
addition, the simulation with the higher imported inputs share creates a much larger wedge 
between the Solow residual and true TFP (see Figure 3). An average decline of about 1.2 
percent in true TFP when Sudden Stops hit translates into an average decline in the Solow 
residual that is almost twice as large. Thus, a higher share of imported inputs improves the 
model’s ability to match observed Sudden Stop dynamics, with larger declines in production, 
consumption and factor allocations, and with a larger fraction of the output drop accounted 
for by the Solow residual. 
 
  The above results for higher η are important because the baseline calibration value of 
η=0.1 is probably conservative. Evidence from other countries suggests that imported inputs 
can have much higher shares. Goldberg and Campa (2006) report ratios of imported inputs 
to total intermediate goods for 17 industrial countries that vary from 14 to 49 percent, with 
a median of 23 percent (the ratio for Mexico is about ¼). Moreover, to the extent that 
domestically produced inputs are substitutes for imported inputs, and purchases of these 
domestic inputs require working capital financing, the scenario with the higher η is likely to 
be closer to the one that is empirically relevant, because domestic inputs would respond to a 
similar amplification mechanism as the one affecting imported inputs.
9 
 
  The model simulation with lower labor supply elasticity retains the same overall 
qualitative features of the Sudden Stop events of the baseline simulation: The simulation 
still produces SS events preceded by periods of expansion and followed by gradual recoveries. 
With the weakened response of labor supply, however, the amplitude of the fluctuations is 
smaller, and the gap between true TFP and the Solow residual when the Sudden Stop hits is 
narrower, so the model does not do as well as the baseline in terms of matching the 
dynamics observed in actual data. In contrast with what we observed in the exercise that 
changed the share of imported inputs, lowering the labor supply elasticity does affect the 
behavior of investment and asset prices, both of which exhibit smaller declines than in the 
baseline scenario. Thus, these results show that labor supply elasticity of about 1.2, as in the 
baseline, or higher, is important for the model’s ability to explain observed SS dynamics. 
 
5.       Conclusions 
 
  This paper shows that the quantitative predictions of an equilibrium business cycle 
model with an endogenous collateral constraint are consistent with key features of the 
Sudden Stop phenomenon. The constraint imposes an upper bound on the economy’s 
leverage ratio by limiting total debt, including working capital loans, not to exceed a 
fraction of the market value of collateral assets. This constraint only binds in states of 
                                          
9 Extending the model to include domestic inputs, however, is a challenging task because it requires 
modeling supply and demand of these inputs with and endogenous price. The model can be modified 
following Mendoza and Yue (2008) to introduce the two inputs using an Armington aggregator, but 
the solution algorithm for the setup with occasionally binding, endogenous collateral constraints is 
harder to solve and runs against the curse of dimensionality.   
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nature in which the leverage ratio is sufficiently high, and in turn these high-leverage states 
are an endogenous outcome of the model’s business cycle dynamics.   
 
  The model’s collateral constraint introduces a credit channel with two important 
distortions: one is in the form of external financing premia affecting the cost of borrowing in 
one-period debt and within-period working capital loans, and the second is Fisher’s debt-
deflation mechanism. This mechanism plays a key role in the ability of the model to explain 
Sudden Stops. When the leverage ratio is sufficiently high, shocks of standard magnitude 
that result in RBC-like responses under perfect credit markets trigger the collateral 
constraint. This causes a fall in investment and equity prices which tightens further the 
constraint and leads to a spiraling collapse of credit, asset prices and investment, a decline 
in consumption and a surge in the external accounts. Moreover, the binding credit limit 
hampers access to working capital, causing a contemporaneous decline in output and factor 
allocations.  
 
  This paper’s quantitative analysis show that the long-run business cycle moments of 
economies with and without the collateral constraint differ marginally, while the mean 
responses to one-standard-deviation shocks conditional on Sudden Stop states with positive 
long-run probability differ sharply across the two economies. Thus, in contrast with findings 
of previous studies, the collateral constraint produces significant amplification and 
asymmetry in the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to shocks of standard magnitudes 
on the same exogenous factors that drive normal business cycles (TFP, interest rates and 
imported input prices). In addition, because of precautionary saving, Sudden Stops are 
infrequent events nested within normal business cycles in the stochastic stationary 
equilibrium. Thus, the model proposed here provides an explanation of Sudden Stops that 
does not rely on large, unexpected shocks, and integrates a theory of business cycles with a 
theory of Sudden Stops within the same DSGE framework. 
 
  A comparative event analysis of Sudden Stops in the data and in the model shows that 
the model matches key features of actual Sudden Stops. In particular, Sudden Stops in the 
model are preceded by periods of economic expansion and external deficits, followed by large 
recessions and reversals in the external accounts when Sudden Stops hit, and then followed 
by gradual recovery. Moreover, Solow residuals exaggerate the contribution of true TFP to 
the Sudden Stops’ output drop. These results are robust to variations in the labor supply 
elasticity and the share of imported inputs in production. In contrast, the assumption that 
the collateral constraint limits access to working capital financing plays an important role. 
 
  An interesting extension of this framework would be to study a setup with “liability 
dollarization,” in which foreign debt is denominated in a hard currency (i.e. tradable goods) 
but largely leveraged on assets and/or incomes in domestic currency and generated by non-
tradables industries. This is important to consider because Sudden Stops also featured large 
drops in the relative price of nontradables, and in many cases large nominal devaluations 
(with exceptions like Hong Kong 1998 and Argentina 1995). A large, exogenous devaluation 
can be viewed as the cause of a Sudden Stop in this situation, but an alternative is to model 
a debt-deflation mechanism operating through a fall in the relative price of nontradables. 
Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) study a model with this feature in a setup without 
capital accumulation and where the debt limit is a function of income rather than the value 
of capital.   
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  The findings of this paper suggest that the key to reducing the probability of Sudden 
Stops is in promoting the attainment of levels of financial development that weaken the 
contractual frictions behind collateral constraints. In contrast, taking as given the underlying 
uncertainty in the form of aggregate shocks to TFP, world interest rates and relative prices, 
tighter “marked-to-market” capital requirements or “value-at-risk” targets, designed to 
manage exposure to idiosyncratic risk, can be counterproductive and raise the probability of 
observing Sudden Stops. Other policy conclusions derived from this analysis relate to 
financial contagion and the desirability of holding large stocks of foreign reserves. In the 
setup of this paper, an economy can have solid domestic policies and competitive, open 
markets, and still reach a point of high leverage at which a Sudden Stop is caused by a 
relatively small foreign or domestic shock. If waiting for financial development to eliminate 
this problem seems naïve, and since tighter credit limits can make things worse, self 
insurance in the form of a sufficiently large stock of reserves can be a useful way of lowering 
the probability of Sudden Stops. The analysis by Durdu et al. (2008) provides evidence in 
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α 0.592 labor share set to  yield 0.66 share in GDP as α/(1−η)
β 0.306 capital share set to yield 0.33 share in GDP as β/(1−η)
δ 0.088 depreciation rate from perpetual inventories method
R 1.0857 implied by s.s.optimal investment rule
w 1.846 regression estimate using labor supply optimality condition
γ 0.0166 implied by s.s. consumption Euler eq.
b/gdp -0.86 implied by s.s. budget constraint
Average ratios from Mexican data (1993-2005)
η= pv/y 0.102 imported inputs/gross output ratio
k/y 1.758 capital/gross output ratio
pv/gdp 0.114 imported inputs/gdp ratio
gdp/y 0.896 gdp/gross output ratio
c/gdp 0.65 consumption/gdp ratio
g/gdp 0.110 gov. purchases/gdp ratio
i/gdp 0.172 investment/gdp ratio
g/c 0.168 ratio of public to private consumption
Parameters set with SMM
a 2.75 targeted to match ratio of s.d. of investment to s.d. of gdp
φ 0.2579 targeted to yield a mean working capital/gdp ratio of 0.2
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Valuesstandard standard dev.  correlation first-order Sudden Stop 
variable deviation relative to GDP with autocorrelation (date in brackets)
GDP
GDP 2.723 1.000 1.000 0.749 -8.315
(1995:2)
intermediate goods imports 7.850 2.882 0.905 0.759 -27.229
(1995:2)
private consumption
   total 3.397 1.247 0.895 0.701 -8.175
(1995:3)
   non durables & services 2.490 0.914 0.893 0.676 -5.649
(1995:2)
investment 9.767 3.586 0.944 0.816 -30.074
(1995:3)
net exports-GDP ratio 2.109 0.775 -0.688 0.797 4.898
(1995:2)
current account-GDP ratio 1.560 0.573 -0.754 0.720 3.838
(1995:2)
equity prices 14.648 5.379 0.570 0.640 -27.397
(1995:2)
intermediate goods prices 3.345 1.228 -0.377 0.737 5.915
(1995:1)
world real interest rate 1.958 0.719 -0.590 0.572 6.752
(1995:2)
total factor productivity 1.340 0.492 0.519 0.537 -5.082
(1995:2)
Note: The data were expressed in per capita terms, logged and detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  Equity prices are in
units of the GDP deflator. Intermediate goods prices are defined as the ratio of the deflator of imported intermediated goods
divided by the exports deflator. "Sudden Stop" corresponds to the lowest deviation from trend observed in the corresponding 
variable (for variables in GDP ratios it is the largest change in percentage points observed in two consecutive quarters). 
The world real real interest rate is the sum of the return on 3-month U.S. T bills plus the EMBI+ spread for Mexican sovereign debt
minus a measure of expected U.S. CPI inflation (see Uribe and Yue (2005) for details). Total factor productivity is measured 
using a production function for gross output that includes capital, labor and imported intermediate goods. The data are for the 
period 1993:1-2005:2, except the Uribe-Yue real interest rate, which is for the period 1994:1-2004:1.
Table 2.  Mexico: Business Cycle Statistics and the Sudden Stop of 1995Standard Standard correlation first-order
variable mean deviation deviation with autocorrelation
(in percent) relative to GDP GDP
I. Economy without Collateral Constraint
gdp 390.135 3.90% 1.000 1.000 0.822
c 263.152 4.21% 1.080 0.861 0.817
i 66.203 13.85% 3.552 0.616 0.493
nx/gdp 0.042 3.00% 0.769 -0.191 0.549
k 752.270 4.39% 1.125 0.756 0.962
b/gdp -0.326 17.57% 4.505 -0.023 0.175
q 1.000 3.33% 0.854 0.379 0.440
leverage ratio -0.266 8.32% 2.133 0.001 0.083
v 42.247 5.85% 1.501 0.830 0.776
working capital 75.993 4.32% 1.107 0.995 0.801
Savings-investment correlation 0.539
GDP-world interest rate correlation -0.665
GDP-int. goods price correlation -0.168
II. Economy with 30% Collateral Coefficient (κ = 0.30)
gdp 389.512 3.96% 1.000 1.000 0.818
c 264.581 4.07% 1.030 0.909 0.792
i 66.093 13.66% 3.453 0.628 0.492
Table 3.  Long-Run Business Cycle Moments 
nx/gdp 0.036 2.76% 0.697 -0.213 0.490
k 751.015 4.39% 1.109 0.751 0.963
b/gdp -0.257 12.57% 3.177 -0.071 0.124
q 1.000 3.28% 0.828 0.390 0.438
leverage ratio -0.232 5.86% 1.482 -0.043 0.058
v 42.128 6.02% 1.523 0.836 0.770
working capital 75.777 4.51% 1.139 0.990 0.785
Savings-investment correlation 0.512
GDP-world interest rate correlation -0.657
GDP-int. goods price correlation -0.173
III. Economy with 20% Collateral Coefficient (κ = 0.2)
gdp 388.339 3.85% 1.000 1.000 0.815
c 267.857 3.69% 0.959 0.931 0.766
i 65.802 13.45% 3.496 0.641 0.483
nx/gdp 0.024 2.58% 0.671 -0.184 0.447
k 747.709 4.31% 1.120 0.744 0.963
b/gdp -0.104 8.90% 2.313 -0.298 0.087
q 1.000 3.23% 0.839 0.406 0.428
leverage ratio -0.159 4.07% 1.057 -0.258 0.040
v 41.949 5.84% 1.517 0.823 0.764
working capital 75.455 4.26% 1.107 0.987 0.777
Savings-investment correlation 0.391
GDP-world interest rate correlation -0.645
GDP-int. goods price correlation -0.180S.S. non S.S. S.S. non S.S. S.S. non S.S. S.S non S.S S.S non S.S
states states states states states states states states states states
gdp -1.13 -0.11 -1.18 -0.06 -1.21 -0.14 -0.86 -0.06 0.00 0.00
c  -3.25 -0.31 -3.17 -0.14 -3.15 -0.42 -2.12 -0.23 -1.54 -0.34
i  -11.84 -0.61 -10.73 -0.18 -12.35 -0.91 -7.48 -0.30 -9.71 -1.25
q  -2.88 -0.15 -2.64 -0.04 -2.99 -0.22 -1.81 -0.07 -2.53 -0.31
nx/gdp 3.56 0.25 3.32 0.08 3.47 0.34 2.13 0.17 3.11 0.49
b/gdp 3.57 0.25 3.00 0.06 3.60 0.36 2.11 0.18 3.31 0.53
lev. ratio 1.31 0.12 0.89 0.04 1.47 0.18 0.83 0.09 0.90 0.17
L  -1.71 -0.16 -1.79 -0.09 -1.83 -0.22 -1.29 -0.10 0.00 0.00
v  -3.10 -0.29 -3.21 -0.16 -3.31 -0.40 -2.36 -0.18 0.00 0.00
w. cap. -3.12 -0.29 -3.25 -0.16 -3.34 -0.40 -2.37 -0.18 na na
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tfp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Sudden Stop states are defined as states in which the collateral constraint binds with positive long-run probability and the net exports-GDP ratio is at least 2 percentage points
above its mean.
9.54%
-0.20 b/gdp in SS events -0.21 -0.17
threshold
(mean differences relative to frictionless economy in percent of frictionless averages)
Table 4. Amplification and Asymmetry Features of Sudden Stop Events
baseline economy
-0.44
prob. of SS events 1.07% 3.32% 3.92%
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